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cularly if, at the II&Dle  time,  the totalitarian re-
gime ceased to poison the springs. 
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Th,e Common Market 
Queltion: Could you  define  explicitly France's 
position  towards  Britain's entry into  the  Com-
mon  Market and the political evolution of Eur-
ope f 
Answer: A very clear question, to which I  shall 
endeavour to reply clearly. 
I  believe  that when  you  talk about  econo-
mics  - and much  more  so  when  you  practise 
them  - what  you  say and  what  you  do  must 
conform  to  realities,  because  without  that you 
can get into impasses and,  sometimes,  you  even 
head for ruin. 
In this  very great affair of  the  European 
Economic  Community and also  in that of even-
tual  adhesion  of  Great  Britain,  it is  the  facts 
that must first be  considered.  Feelings,  favour-
able  though they might be  and are,  these  feel-
ings cannot be  invoked  against  the  real  facts 
of the problem. What are these factsf 
The Treaty of Rome was concluded between 
six  continental  States,  States which  are,  econo-
mically  speaking,  one  may  say,  of  the  same 
nature.  Indeed, whether it be  a matter of their 
industrial or agricultural production, their exter-
nal exchanges,  their habits  or their commercial 
clientele,  their  living  or  working  conditions, 
there  is  between  them  much  more  resemblance 
than  difference.  Moreover,  they  are  adjacent, 
they inter-penetrate,  they  prolong  each  other 
through their communications. It is  therefore a 
I. 8otwcf: Auembly of WEU,  The Political Year in 
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fact to  group  them and to link them  in such  a 
way  that what they have to produce, to buy,  to 
sell,  to consume  - well,  they do  produce, buy, 
sell,  consume,  in preference  in  their  own  en-
semble.  Doing that is conforming to realities. 
Moreover,  it must be  added  that from  the 
point  of  view  of  their  economic  development, 
their  social  progress,  their  technical  capacity, 
they , are,  in  short,  keeping  pace.  They  are 
marching in similar fashion. It  so  happens, too, 
that there is between  them no  kind of political 
grievance,  no  frontier  question,  no  rivalry  in 
domination or power.  On  the contrary, they are 
joined  in  solidarity,  especially  and  primarily, 
from  the aspect  of  the  consciousness  they have 
of  defining  together  an  important  part of  the 
sources of our civilisation; and also  as concerns 
their security, because they are continentals and 
have before them one and the same menace from 
one  extremity  to  the  other  of  their  territorial 
ensemble.  Then,  finally,  they  are  in solidarity 
through  the  fact  that not  one  among  them  is 
bound  abroad  by  any  particular  political  or 
military accord. 
Thus it was  psychologically  and materially 
possible to  make  an economic  community of the 
Six,  though  not without  difficulties.  When  the 
Treaty of Rome  was signed in 1957, it was after 
long discussions;  and when it was  concluded,  it 
was necessary - in order to  achieve  something 
- that we  French  put in order our economic, 
financial, and monetary affairs ... and that was 
done in 1959. From that moment the community 
was  in principle viable,  but then the treaty had 
to be applied. 
However, this treaty, which was precise and 
complete  enough  concerning  industry,  was  not 
at all so on the subject of agriculture. However, 
for our country this had to  be  settled.  Indeed, 
it is obvious  that agriculture is an essential ele-
ment in the whole  of our national activity.  We 
cannot conceive, and will not conceive, of a Com-
mon  Market in which French agriculture would 
not find outlets in keeping with its production. 
And we  agree,  further, that of  the  Six we  are 
the country on which this necessity is imposed in 
the most imperative manner. 
This  is  why  when,  last January, thought 
was  given to the setting in motion of the second 
phase · of  the  treaty  - in  other  words  a 
practical start in application - we  were led  to 
pose- the entry of agriculture into the Common DOOUJUNTATi:ON 
Market  aa  a formal  condition.  This  was  fina!lly 
accepted by our partnel'l but very difficult and 
very complex arrangements were needed - and 
some  rulings  are  still  outstanding.  I  tDote  in 
passing that in this vast undertaking it was the 
govemmenta that took all the decisiona,  because 
authority and responsibility are not to be found 
elsewhere. But I must say that in preparing and 
untangling  these  mattel'l,  the  Commission  in 
Bruasel.s  did  aome  very  objective  and  fitting 
work.  Thereupon Great Britain posed her candi-
dature to  the Common llarket. She did it after 
having earlier refused to participate in the com-
munities  we  are now  building,  as  well  as  after 
creating a free trade area with six other States, 
and,  finally,  after having- I  may  well  say  it 
(the negotiations held at such length on this sub-
ject will  be  recalled)  - after having put some 
pressure on  the Six to prevent a real beginning 
being  made  in the  application  of  the  Common 
Market. If England asks  in turn to  enter,  but 
on  her own  conditions, this poses without doubt 
to each of the six States, and poses to England, 
problems of a very great dimension. 
England  in  effect  is  insular,  she  is  mari-
time,  she  is  linked  through her exchanges,  her 
markets,  her  supply  lines  to  the  most  diverse 
and often  the most  diatant countries ; she  pur-
sues essentially industrial and commercial activi-
ties,  and  only slight agricultural ones.  She  has 
in all her doings very marked and very original 
habits and traditions. 
In short, the nature, the structure, the very 
situation (conjuncture) that are England's differ 
profoundly from thoee of the continentals. What 
is to  be done in order that England, as she lives, 
produces  and  trades,  can  be  incorporated  into 
the  Common  Market,  as  it has  been  conceived 
and  as  it functions t  For example,  the  means 
by  which  the  people  of  Great  Britain  are  fed 
and which  are in fact the importation of  food-
stuffs bought cheaply in the two  Americas and 
in the former  dominions,  at the same  time giv-
ing,  granting considerable  subsidies  to  English 
farmers T These means  are  obviously  incompat-
ible  with  the system  which  the Six have  estab-
lished quite naturally for  themselves. 
The  system  of  the  Six  - this  constitutes 
making  a  whole  of the agricultural produce of 
the  whole  Community,  in  strictly  fixing  their 
prices,  in  prohibiting  subsidies,  in  organising 
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their consumption  between  all  the  participants, 
and  in  imposing  on  each  of  ita  participants 
payment to  the Community of any saving they 
would  achieve  in fetching  their food  from  out-
side instead of eating what the Common  Market 
has  to  offer.  Once  again,  what is to  be  done  to 
bring England, as she is,  into this system 7 
One  might  sometimes  have  believed  that 
our English friends, in posing their candidature 
to  the Common  Market,  were  agreeing to  trans-
form themselves to the point of applying all the 
conditions which  are accepted  and practised by 
the Six. But the question, to know whether Great 
Britain can now place herself like the Continent 
and with  it  inside  a  tariff which  is  genuinely 
common,  to  renounce all Commonwealth prefer-
ences,  to  cease  any  pretence  that her  agricul-
ture be privileged, and, more than that, to treat 
her engagements with other countries of the free 
trade area as  null and void  - that question  is 
the whole question. 
It  cannot be said that it is yet resolved. Will 
it be  so  one  dayf  Obviously  only  England  can 
answer. The question is even further posed since 
after England other States which are,  I  repeat, 
linked to her through the free trade area, for the 
same  reasons  as  Britain, would  like  or wish  to 
enter the Common Market. 
It must  be  agreed  that first  the  entry  of 
Great Britain, and then these  States,  will com-
pletely  change  the  whole  of  the  actions,  the 
agreements,  the  compensation,  the  rules  which 
have  already been  established  between  the  Six, 
because  all these  States,  like  Britain, have very 
important peculiarities.  Then it will  be  another 
Common Market whose  construction ought to  be 
envisaged; but one  which  would  be  taken to 11 
and then 13  and then perhaps 18 would no  lon-
ger resemble,  without any doubt,  the one  which 
the Six built. 
Further, this community, increasing in such 
fashion,  would  see  itself  faced  v.ith  problems 
of  economic  relations  with  all  kinds  of  other 
States,  and  first  with  the  United  States.  It is 
to be  foreseen  that the cohesion  of its members, 
who would be very numerous and diverse, would 
not endure for long, and that ultimately it would 
appear as  a  colossal  Atlantic community  under 
American dependence  and direction,  and which 
would  quickly have  absorbed  the community of 
Europe  .. DOCUMENTATION 
It is a hypothesis which in the eyes of some 
can  be  perfectly  justified,  but it is  not  at all 
what  France is  doing  or wanted  to  do  - and 
which  is  a  properly European construction. 
Yet  it  is  possible  that  one  day  England 
might  manage  to  transform herself sufficiently 
to  become  part  of  the  European  community, 
without restriction, without reserve  and prefer-
ence  for anything whatsoever;  and in this case 
the Six would open the door to her and France 
would raise no obstacle, although obviously Eng-
land's  simple  participation  in  the  community 
would  considerably  change  its  nature  and  its 
volume. 
It is  possible,  too,  that England might not 
yet be  so  disposed,  and it is  that which  seems 
to  result from  the long,  long,  so  long,  so  long 
Brussels  conversations.  But if that is the  case, 
there  is  nothing  there  that could  be  dramatic. 
First,  whatever  decision  England  takes  in this 
matter there is no  reason,  as far as we  are con-
cerned, for the relations we have with her to  be 
changed, and the consideration, the respect which 
are due to this great State, this great people, will 
not thereby be in the slightest impaired. 
What England  has  done  across  the  cen-
turies and in the world is recognised as immense. 
Although  there  have  often  been  conflicts  with 
France,  Britain's  glorious  participation  in  the 
victory which crowned the first world war - we 
French,  we  shall always  admire  it.  As for  the 
role  England played  in  the most  dramatic  and 
decisive  moments  of  the  second  world  war,  no 
one has the right to forget it. 
In truth, the destiny of the free world,  and 
first  of  all  ours  and  even  that  of  the  United 
States and Russia,  depended in a large measure 
on  the  resolution,  the solidity  and the  courage 
of  the English people,  as  Churchill was  able  to 
harness  them.  Even  at the  present  moment  no 
one can contest British capacity and worth. 
Moreover,  I  repeat,  if the Brussels negotia-
tions were shortly not to succeed,  nothing would 
prevent  the  conclusion  between  the  Common 
Market and Great Britain of an accord of asso-
ciation  designed  to  safeguard  exchanges,  and 
nothing  would  prevent  close  relations  between 
England and France from being maintained, nor 
the pursuit and development of their direct co-
operation in all kinds of fields,  and notably the 
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scientific, technical and industrial - as the two 
countries have  just proved by deciding to  build 
together the supersonic aircraft Concorde. 
Lastly, it is very possible that Britain's own 
evolution,  and  the  evolution  of  the  universe, 
might bring the  English little by little towards 
the  Continent, whatever delays the achievement 
might demand,  and for my part, that is what I 
readily believe,  and that is why,  in my  opinion, 
it will in any case have been a great honour for 
the British Prime Minister, for my friend Harold 
Macmillan,  and  for  his  Government,  to  have 
discerned in good time, to have had enough poli-
tical courage to have proclaimed it, and to  have 
led  their country the first steps down  the  path 
which  one  day,  perhaps,  will  lead  it  to  moor 
alongside the Continent. 
The  Nassau Agreements 
Question : What is France's attitud-e with regard 
to  President Kennedy's  plan for  a  multilateral 
solution, i. e. the Bahamas Agreements T 
Answer: We  are in the  atomic  era and we  are 
a  country  which  can  be  destroyed  at  any 
moment,  unless  the  aggressor  is  deterred  from 
attack by the  certainty that he  too  wiH  suffer 
terrible  destruction.  There  is  thus  justification 
for both  alliance  and independence. 
The  Americans,  our friends  and allies,  for 
a long time alone possessed the nuclear weapon. 
As  long  as  they  had a  monopoly  of  such  wea-
pons and showed their determination to use them 
immediately  Europe.  was  attacked  - for  then 
only  Europe  could  be  attacked  - there  was 
little question of  invasion  as  far as France was 
concerned, attack being improbable  ... 
At that time  the deterrent was  fully effec-
tive and constituted a practically insurmountable 
obstacle to the invasion of Europe  ... 
Since  then,  the  Soviets  too  have  formed  a 
nuclear force  and this force is powerful enough 
to threaten even the life of America  ... 
From that moment,  the immediate  defence 
and the priority given to the defence of Europe, DOOUHENT~TION 
the  military assistance  of the  Europeans which 
formerly  were  basic  factors  in  their  strategy, 
by  necessity,  became  secondary  considerations. 
The recent Cuban affair made this apparent  ... 
Further,  the  means  they  decided  immedi-
ately to use to meet a direct attack, whether from 
Cuba alone or combined with another from else-
where,  were  automatically  directed  towards  an 
objective other than the defence of Europe, even 
though  the latter might  have  been  attacked  in 
turn.  And  then,  to  cap  all,  the  Russians  have 
a  deterrent  as  well  as  the  Americans,  which 
means  that in the event of overall nuclear war-
fare there would inevitably be  fearful and per-
haps mortal  destruction  wreaked  in  both  coun-
tries. In these circumstances no one in the world, 
and particularly in America,  can  say whether, 
where,  when, how and to what extent American 
ntrclear  weapons  would  be  used  to  defend 
Europe  ... 
But it remains  that the  American  nuclear 
power does not meet necessarily and immediately 
all eventualities concerning Europe and France. 
Thus,  principles and circumstances combine 
to make it incumbent upon France to acquire its 
own  nuclear force.  Of course,  this does  not pre-
vent this force  being used  in combination  with 
similar  forces  belonging  to  France's allies.  But 
for  us,  integration  in this  respect  is  inconceiv-
able.  Indeed, everyone knows  we  began, without 
any outside  help  whatsoever,  to  invent,  experi-
ment with,  and  construct  nuclear  bombs  and 
means of delivery. 
It is  quite understandable that this French 
initiative  should  not  seem  very  satisfactory  in 
certain American circles.  In questions of policy 
and strategy as well as economy,  those who have 
a monopoly naturally consider this the best pos-
sible  system.  We  consequently  hear a  combined 
chorus  of  busybodies,  specialists  and  American 
publicists  raising  their  voices  violently  and 
loudly  in opposition  to  our independent  arms. 
''The nuclear force France intends to equip her-
self with is and will remain," they say, "minute 
compared  with  that  of  the  United  States  and 
Russia. It is throwing a lot of money and effort 
away  to  build  such  a  force.  And  again,  the 
United  States  have  overwhelming  superiority 
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within the Alliance, so  their strategy should not 
be opposed by divergent action ! '' 
It is  perfectly  true  that  the  quantity  of 
nuclear  means  with  which  we  will  be  able  to 
equip  ourselves  will  be  far from  matching  the 
mass  of those  of the two  giants  of today.  But 
since  when  has  it been  proved  that  a  people 
should  remain  deprived  of  the  most  efficient 
weapons just because its main possible opponent 
and  its  main  friend  have  means  which  &t'!l 
clearly superior Y... 
I  merely  wish  to  say  that  from  the  very 
outset  the  French  nuclear  force  will  have  the 
sombre  and terrible ability to  destroy in a  few 
seconds  millions  and millions  of men.  This fact 
cannot  fail  to  have  at least some  influence  on 
the intentions of a possible aggressor. 
Then, in the Bahamas, America and Britain 
concluded  an agreement  to  which  we  also  were 
asked  to adhere.  Naturally, I  am only speaking 
of this proposal and this agreement because they 
have  been  published  and their tenor is  known. 
This involves building up a so-called multilateral 
force to which Britain is to contribute its present 
and  future  means  and  the  Americans  some  of 
theirs. 
This  multilateral  force  is  assigned  to  the 
defence of Europe under the American command 
of  NATO.  It is  understood,  however,  that the 
British retain the right to  resume  command  of 
their  nuclear  means  should  this  appear  to  be 
necessary in the higher interests of the country. 
The  main  force  of American  nuclear means  re-
mains  outside  the multilateral  force  under  the 
direct command  of the President of the  United 
States. 
Further, and in fact in compensation,  Bri-
tain can buy from America, if she so wishes,  Po-
laris missiles  which,  as  is  known,  are launched 
from submarines built for this purpose and which 
carry  their  thermonuclear  projectiles  over  dis-
tances of 2,000  or 3,000  kilometers.  The  British 
have  the  benefit  of  American  assistance  for 
building  these  submarines  and  projectiles.  I 
might  add in  this  respect,  that such  assistance 
has  never  been  offered  to  us  and  in  spite  of 
what  has  been  said,  it must  be  stated that we 
have never requested it. DOOUJUIINTA.TION 
France has taken note of the Anglo-Ameri-
can agreement in the  Bahamas.  In view  of  its 
terms,  no  one  will  be  surprised that we  are un-
able to subscribe to it. It would really be no  use 
for  us  to  buy  Polaris  missiles  when  we  have 
neither the  submarines to  launch them  nor the 
thermonuclear warheads to arm them.  No  doubt 
the  day  will  come  when  we  shall  have  these 
submarines and nuclear warheads.  But it is not 
for  tomorrow  because  the  world  war,  invasion 
and their sequels have considerably delayed our 
nuclear  development.  The  day  we  have  these 
submarines and warheads, what will the Polaris 
be  worth 7 Probably by then we  shall have  mis-
siles we have invented ourselves. In other words, 
for  us,  technically  speaking,  this  is  not  what 
might be called a topical proposition. 
But also  it docs  not  fulfil  the  principle  I 
mentioned  just now  which  is  to  have  our own 
deterrent force.  To  pour our means into a multi-
lateral  force  under  foreign  command  would  be 
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running counter to  this principle of our defence 
and our policy.  It is  true that we  too  may  be 
able, in theory, to retain the right to regain con-
trol of those of our forces which are incorporated 
in the multilateral force in cases of absolute ne-
ceSBity.  But how  would  we  do  it in practice in 
the unparalleled moments of nuclear apocalypse T 
Then again, this multilateral force  would  neces-
sarily involve such  an entanglement of liaisons, 
internal  interference,  and  external  constraints 
that  if an  integral  part  of  it  were  suddenly 
snatched away there would be  a great danger of 
paralysing it just at the moment  when  perhaps 
it would have to go  into action. 
Thus  we  abide  by  the  decision  we  have 
reached : to  build and,  if necessary,  to use  our 
own  nuclear  force.  Of  course,  in  doing  so  we 
shall  not  refuse  co-operation,  whether  technical 
or strategic, if that is the wish  of our allies  ... 